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Discovery of Information in Possession
of Government Agencies and Bureaus Over a
Claim of Privilege by the Government
THE FEDERAL DISCOVERY PROVISIONS AND THEIR APPLICABILITY TO THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for pre-trial dis-
covery of testimony and pre-trial inspection of documentary evidence.'
The discovery provisions allow a party to inquire into his opponent's
case prior to trial in order to know what issues and facts exist. In ad-
dition to eliciting facts, such discovery narrows the issues and elimi-
nates unfair elements of surprise.2 Before provisions were made for
discovery in the various codes of procedure, the only method available
to obtain knowledge of the opponent's case, outside of his pleadings,
was in equity through a bill of discovery. The broadening of the dis-
covery provisions in the Rules in 1937 was a wise step, both in stream-
lining civil procedure and in affording justice to litigants.
It is generally conceded that the provisions pertaining to discovery
apply to the United States as a party. Such appears to be the intent of
the drafters of the Rules as evidenced by their statements made con-
1 Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. rule 34, 28 U.S.C.A. (1950). "Upon motion of any
party showing good cause therefore . . . the court in which an action is pending
may (I) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing . . . of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain
evidence relating to any of the matters within the scope of the examination per-
mitted. ... Rules 26-32 and 45 (b) and (d) authorize the issuance of similar
orders to persons not parties to the action.
2 "The pre-trial deposition-discovery mechanism established by Rules 26 to 37
is one of the most significant innovations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under the prior federal practice, the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-
formulation and fact-revalation were performed primarily and inadequately by the
pleadings. Inquiry into the issues and the facts before trial was narrowly confined
and was often cumbersome in method. The new rules, however, restrict the plead-
ings to the task of general notice-giving and invest the deposition-discovery process
with a vital role in the preparation for trial. The various instruments of discovery
now serve (1) as a device ... to narrow and clarify issues . . . and (2) as a device
for ascertaining the facts, or information as to the existence or whereabouts of facts,
relative to those issues. Thus civil trials in the federal courts no longer need be
carried on in the dark. The way is now clear, consistent with recognized privileges,
for the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before
trial." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1946).
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temporaneously to the drafting of the Rules.3 The rules of statutory
construction providing that provisions of a statute that are binding do
not apply to the Government unless specifically mentioned does not
appear to be applicable here because whenever it has been intended to
exempt the United States from provisions of the Rules specific mention
of that intent has been made. An example of such an exemption is Rule
37 (f) which forbids the imposition of expenses and attorney fees on
the United States. 4 It follows that since the United States is not else-
where mentioned, the discovery provisions are fully applicable to it as
a party, and the courts have so held.; A different result is often reached
when the United States is not a party in the litigation. The Rules are
broad enough to allow subpoenas duces tecum and ad testificandum to
be issued to government officials who have custody of information
relevant to the trial even when the Government and such officials are
not interested in the trial. Whether such discovery will or should be
compelled will be discussed later.
The discovery provisions are still subject to the objection of
"privilege", and a person, including the United States, served with a
subpoena or interrogatory will not be compelled to comply with either
if the information sought is of the type privileged against disclosure in
court. Thus, all courts will refuse a motion to compel the delivery of
information in the hands of the Government that contains state or
military secrets involving the security of the United States.6 The public
policy behind such a privilege is obvious. A like privilege allows the
government to withold the names of those who provide it with in-
formation regarding the activities of others who are violating laws.7
The reason for this privilege is to encourage such disclosures to the
Government and to protect the informant. Finally, a similar privilege
is afforded the Government concerning information delivered to it by
individuals under compulsion of law.8 The policy behind this privilege
is not too clear but seems to be one largely of fairness; secrecy should
3 Charles E. Clark, reporter for the Advisory Committee stated " ... it was our
theory that except as we made special provisions these rules apply to the United
States as a litigant as much as to anyone else." Proceedings of the Institute of the
Am. Bar Ass'n., F.R.C.P., Wash., N.Y. 50 (1938).
4 Other sections of the Rules providing for special treatment of the United
States are Rules 4(4); 12(a); 25 (d); 39(c); 54(d); 55 (e); 62(e); 65 (c).
G United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 553 (1951); United States v.
General Motors Corp., 2 F.R.D. 528, 530 (N.D.IlI. 1942).
0 United States v. Haugen, 58 F. Supp. 436 (E.D.Wash. 1944); Pollen v. Ford
Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
7 In re Quarles g- Butler, 158 U.S. 532 (1894); Vogel v. Granz, 110 U.S. 811
(1884). When a disclosure of the information does not disclose its source, then the
privilege should only cover the identity of the informer and not the information
itself. 8 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §2874, p. 755 (3rd ed. 1940).
8 O'Connell v. Olsen & Ugelstadt, 10 F.R.D. 142 (N.D.Ohio 1949); See 8
WxGoR, EVIDENCE §2377 (3rd ed. 1940).
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be promised to those who, by law, are compelled to furnish the Gov-
ernment with reports and other information to aid it in the conduct of
its administrative functions.
No difficulty is ordinarily encountered by the Government in re-
fusing to comply with a discovery order when one of the above three
privileges has been established. The only problem is in deciding who
is to determine if the privilege exists, the court or the executive who is
claiming the privilege. The problem is shown, for instance, when the
Government refuses to comply with a court order to disclose certain
documents on the ground that the information contains state secrets
involving the security of the nation. Will the court abide by this refusal
and thereby leave the discretion with the executive to declare privileged
what he will, or will it demand proof that the information contains
state secrets? The courts have held that any claim of privilege against
disclosing relevant evidence in a pending law suit involves a justiciable
question to be decided by a court.9 The merits of this reasoning by the
courts will be discussed more fully later.
DIscovERY OF FEDERAL HOUSEKEEPING REcoRDS
A fourth type of privilege often claimed by the Government is a
broad one against any disclosure of the results of what the Government
calls its "housekeeping" investigations.10 This claim on the part of
the Government has arisen as a result of Section 161 of the Revised
Statutes'1 which gives to the head of each department the authority
to prescribe regulations for the custody of its records. In pursuance of
Section 161 the various departments have promulgated custody regu-
lations usually denying disclosure of any information without the
approval of the head of the department. 12 Whether the court will still
9 Reynolds v. United States, 192 F. 2d 987 (3rd Cir. 1951); cert. granted, 96 L.
Ed. 555 (1952); Evans v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 255 (W.D. La. 1950); Cresmer v.
United States, 9 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1949).
10 Reynolds v. United States, supra note 9; Bank Line v. United States, 76 F.
Supp. 801, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
11 "Sec. 161. The head of each department is authorized to prescribe regula-
tions, not inconsistent with law, for the government of his department, the conduct
of its officers and clerks, the distribution and performance of its business and the
custody, use, and preservation of the records, papers, and property appertaining to it."
12 For example, the Department of Justice has provided that "all official files,
documents, records and information in the offices of the Department of Justice...
are to be regarded as confidential. No officer or employee may permit the disclosure
or use of the same for any purpose other than for the performance of his official
duties, except in the discretion of the Attorney General, The Assistant to the
Attorney General, or an Assistant Attorney General acting for him.
"Whenever a subpoena duces tecum is served to produce any of such fies,
documents, records or information, the officer or employee on whom such subpoena
[Vol. 13
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require disclosure of the information in spite of this privilege claimed
by the Government depends largely on the relation of the Government
to the action. There are three situations in which a demand for dis-
closure of information in possession of the Government may arise:
first, when the Government is not a party to the action; second, when
the Government is a party plaintiff in the action; third, when the
Government is a party defendant in the action. Each situation will be
treated separately.
When the Government Is Not a Party To the Action.
Ever since Boske v. Comingore 13 it has been felt that in actions
between private parties the Government would not be required to
disclose any records they had declared confidential. The Boske case
arose when the State of Kentucky held a federal Collector of Internal
Revenue in contempt of court because he refused to disclose records
in compliance with a subpoena issued by the state court. The sub-
poena ordered production of the Internal Revenue Bureau's records
pertaining to a private party being sued in the state court for collec-
tion of back taxes on stored whiskey. The Collector refused to dis-
close the records because the Secretary of the Treasury, in accordance
with Section 161 of the Revised Statutes, had declared the records
confidential, 14 and when committed for contempt, the Collector sued
out a writ of habeas corpus. The Court said, in granting the writ,
it was lawful for the Secretary of the Treasury to forbid disclosure of
the Department's records by subordinates. All that the Court did in this
case was to protect the Treasury official from being held in contempt
for simply following his superior's orders. 15
A result similar to that in the Boske case was reached in Ex parte
Sackett.1 6 The plaintiff in a private action to enforce the Sherman
Anti-Trust Law sought to compel an agent of the Department of
Justice to disclose information obtained by that Department in its
is served, unless otherwise expressly directed by the Attorney General, will appear
in court in answer thereto and respectfully decline to produce the records specified
therein, on the ground that the disclosure of such records is prohibited by this
regulation." Department of Justice Order No. 3229, 28 C.F.R. §51.71, 14 Fed. Reg.
4920 (1946).
Is 177 U.S. 459 (1900).
14 In addition to the general regulation making such information confidential,
Section 3167 of the Revised Statutes provided for the imprisonment, not to exceed
one year, or the subjection to a fine, not to exceed $1000, or both, of any collector,
inspector, or other officer divulging such information as the state court sought.
15 The difficult question raised by the case could have been avoided by declar-
ing the information privileged on the ground that it had been given under com-
pulsion of law. See note 8, supra.
16 74 F. 2d 922 (9th Cir. 1935).
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own investigation of the defendant. When the agent refused to dis-
close the information because he was forbidden by a Department
regulation,17 the court held him in contempt. In granting a writ of
habeus corpus to the agent the Circuit Court of Appeals relied on
the Boske case. In United States ex rel Touhey v. Ragen' 8 another
Department of Justice order,19 as in the Sackett case, was held to
justify an agent's refusal to produce F.B.I. records in conformance to
a subpoena duces tecum issued in a suit between private parties and
directed to the agent. The court said that the order of the Depart-
ment promulgated under Section 161 conferred upon the Department
the privilege of refusing to produce unless it had waived such privi-
lege.
These cases decided only that a subordinate may not be punished
for complying with a regulation of his department. The question of
whether the department head could have been required to produce
the information sought was not raised. There are feelings both ways.
The Attorney General has taken the position, which the Department
of Justice still follows, that the head of a department may "properly
decline to furnish official records of the Department, or copies thereof,
or to give testimony in a cause pending in court, whenever in [his]
judgment the production of such papers or the giving of such testi-
mony might prove prejudicial for any reason to the Government or
the public interest." 20  Others feel that since private non-litigants
may be compelled to give testimony or furnish information, and since
the discovery provisions are fully applicable to the United States,
there should be no submission by the courts to the claim by an agency
that one of its own regulations makes the information privileged. 21
The argument runs that in the light of the Rules any regulation by a
department that forbids compliance with the discovery provisions is
"inconsistent with law" and therefore not under the authority of
Section 161.22 This seems to be the better reasoned argument. It
recognizes that perhaps there is information that in the public in-
terest should not be disclosed, and if so, that information should be
privileged from such disclosure; but, just because a rule of evidence
involves the public interest is no reason to remove it from the reaches
of the judiciary where it inherently belongs. The court should de-
termine in each case if the privilege has been validly claimed.
17 Section 65, Rules and Regulations of the Division of Investigation, United
States Department of Justice.
18 180 F. 2d 321 (7th Cir. 1950).
19 Order No. 3229, note 12, supra.
20 25 Op. Atty. Gen. 326 (1905).
21 Berger and Krash, Government Immunity from Discovery, 59 YALE: L. J. 1451
(1950); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDFNCE §§2378, 2378a, 2379 (3rd ed. 1940).
22 Section 161, reprinted in note 11, supra, provides only for regulations "not
inconsistent with law."
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If the court would overrule the Government's claim of privilege,
the only sanction it would have to enforce the subpoena would be to
hold the department head in contempt of court. The courts have
been reluctant to do this.23 Professor Moore in his work on federal
practice said it would be unseemly for a federal court to hold a
cabinet officer or department head in contempt, and that therefore the
determination of the head ofJ the department not to disclose the in-
formation in litigation between private parties is for practical pur-
poses final and unreviewable. 24
When the Government Is Party-Plaintiff To the Action.
When the government is a party to the action the courts can no
longer refuse to allow discovery against it on a basis that the court
has no sanctions to which the Government may be subjected. If the
Government refuses to comply to a discovery order its proof may be
limited, its action can be stayed or even dismissed, or facts may be
taken as established against it.26
Although in criminal prosecutions there are no broad discovery
provisions as in the Rules of Civil Procedure it is held that the
Government, by initiating a criminal proceeding waives any privilege
it had to withhold testimony or other documents which touch upon
the issues in the prosecution. Underlying this fiction is the sound
public policy that no one should be convicted without giving him an
opportunity to examine the material which might exculpate him. 2 6
It is certain that the Government can claim no privilege as to docu-
23 "Also it will be observed that we are not called upon to decide whether the
Government's contention [that of an executive as opposed to a judicial determina-
tion of privilege] is available as a defense against the enforcement of the desired
subpoena duces tecum directed to the [executive] or a contempt proceeding against
him for failure to obey it. Such a case would indeed, as the Government argues,
raise difficult constitutional questions arising out of the separation of powers under
our Constitution." Reynolds v. United States, note 9, supra, at 993. Cf. Thompson
v. German Valley R. Co., 22 N.J. Eq. 111 (1871); Appeal of Hartranft, 85 Pa.
433 (1877).
24 4 MOORE'S FEDE.AL PRACTICE §26.25 (5), p. 1167 (2d ed. 1950). But in United
States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 1 (C.C. Ky. 1806), where the court had before it the
question of whether a subpoena duces tecurn could issue to the President, Chief
Justice Marshall stated, at pp. 191-2, "The president, although subject to the general
rules which apply to others, may have sufficient motives for declining to produce a
particular paper, and these motives may be such as to restrain the court from en-
forcing its production. ... At the same time, the court could not refuse to pay
proper attention to the affadavit of the accused [who requested the paper]."
2G See Rule 37 for a variety of consequences, at the court's discretion, that
may follow a refusal to comply with a discovery order.
26 United States ex rel. Schlueter v. Watkins, 67 F. Supp. 556 (S.D.N.Y 1946),
af 'd. without consideration of this point, 158 F. 2d 853 (2d Cir. 1946).
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ments which relate to "those very dealings" which the Government is
acting against.2 7 This is limited to the extent that the Government
will not be compelled to disclose state secrets or informer's name.2 8
Similarly, the Government is held to have waived any blanket
privilege of withholding information when it institutes civil proceed-
ings against persons to enforce the anti-trust laws, the Fair Labor
Standards Act, or other governmental regulations.2 9 In United States
v. Cotten Valley Operators Committee,8 0 in a four-four decision, the
Supreme Court affirmed the action of the lower court in dismissing an
anti-trust suit against the defendants because the Government refused
to produce information relevant to the case in compliance with a dis-
covery order. The Government had contended that the Attorney
General had classified the material confidential and that the court
could not decide otherwise. The court said that it would consider
any privilege the Attorney General claimed, but that to leave the
question of privilege entirely in the hands of the Attorney General
would be an abdication of the court's duty.3 1 The court did say that
if it found that disclosure of any of the documents would be injurious
to the public interest, such disclosure would not be required. 32 There-
fore it appears that if the Government institutes legal proceedings
against a party, no regulation of the Government will allow it to
refuse to disclose information of the basis that the regulation has
taken from the court and given to the executive the discretion of
deciding whether the information is privileged.
When the Government is Party-Defendant To the Action.
The Government has continued to claim a privilege from dis-
covery in many actions in which it is defendant, i.e., in actions under
the Federal Tort Claims Act or the Suits in Admiralty Act. It con-
tinues to claim that Section 161 authorizes the various departments
and agencies to forbid the disclosure of any information, even in
actions to which it is a party.
27 United States v. Andolschek, 142 F. 2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944); See 4 MooRE's
FEamLAu PRACTICE §26.25 (6), pp. 1173-75 (2d ed. 1950).
28 Arnstein v. United States, 296 Fed. 946 (D.C. Cir. 1924); United States v.
Haugen, note 6, supra. But cf. United States v. Coplon, 185 F. 2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950).
The informer's privilege is not absolute. If the informer's name is essential
to the defendant's case, its disclosure may be compelled. Sorrentino v. United States,
163 F. 2d 627 (9th Cir. 1947).
29 This class of cases includes also those cases in which private parties enjoin
the regulatory action of the Government.
80 9 F.R.D. 719 (W.D.La. 1948), affd., 339 U.S. 940 (1949).
83 9 F.R.D. 720.
82 Id. at 721
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Reynolds v. United States33 presents the problem squarely. In
three consolidated suits against the Government by three widows of
deceased civilians killed in a crash of an Air Force plane, the United
States refused to produce documents requested by order of the court.
One of the documents requested was a copy of the investigative report
of the accident. The Government refused to produce this document
on two grounds:3 4 first, that Section 161, in giving to the Secretary of
the Air Force authority to prescribe regulations for the control of
the records and papers of his Department, gives him the discretionary
power in the public interest to declare any such records or papers
privileged from disclosure in a judicial proceeding; second, that the
Secretary of the Air Force had determined that these documents con-
tained state secrets and this determination by him is conclusive. The
district court overruled these contentions by the Government, and
when they still refused to produce the information, the district judge
entered an order under Rule 37 that the facts in plaintiff's favor on
the issue of negligence be taken as established and prohibited the
Government from introducing evidence to controvert those facts.
In affirming the action taken in the district court, the Court of
Appeals, through Judge Mars, discussed each of the Government's
contentions separately. In regard to the first contention, Judge
Mars said:
It will be seen that the privilege thus claimed is a broad one
against any disclosure of the results of what the Government
has aptly called its "housekeeping" investigations ... . But we
do not think that in the present cases... the Department...
is entitled to the absolute "housekeeping" privilege which it
asserts against disclosing any statements or reports relating
to this airplane accident regardless of their contents ....
Where, as here, the United States has consented to be sued
as a private person, whatever public interest there may be in
avoiding any disclosure of accident reports in order to promote
accident prevention must yield to what Congress evidently
regarded as the greater public interest involved in seeing that
justice is done to persons injured by governmental operations
.... Moreover we regard the recognition of such a sweeping
privilege against any disclosure of the internal operations of
the executive departments of the Government as contrary
to a sound public policy.35
In answer to the Government's second contention, that the
Secretary of the Air Force had determined that the information
33 Note 9, supra.
34 The court also overruled a third contention of the Government, that the
plaintiffs had not shown good cause for discovery.
35 192 F. 2d at 995.
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contained state secrets and that this determination bound the court,
Judge Maris said:
We cannot accede to this proposition. On the contrary we are
satisfied that a claim of privilege against disclosing evidence
relevant to the issues in a pending law suit involves a justici-
able question, traditionally within the competence of the
courts, which is to be determined in accordance with the ap-
propriate rules of evidence, upon the submission of the docu-
ments in question to the judge for his examination in camera.
Such examination must obviously be ex parte and in camera
if the privilege is not to be lost in its assertion. But to hold
that the head of an executive department of the Govern-
ment in a suit to which the United States is a party may con-
clusively determine the Government's claim of privilege is to
abdicate the judicial function and permit the executive
branch of the Government to infringe the independent
province of the judiciary as laid down by the Constitution.3 6
It appears therefore that in the absence of a valid privilege, no
regulation authorized by Section 161 forbidding disclosure of docu-
ments will in itself be recognized by a court as permitting the Govern-
ment to hold back information that relates to a case in which the
Government is a party. Neither will a court permit the executive
branch the discretionary power to determine itself, in place of the
court, whether a valid privilege exists. The Government will be
treated like any other private individual when it appears as a litigant,
and in order to establish a privilege it must do so in the same manner
required of a private individual.37
CONCLUSIONS
One can easily raise the question of whether there should be a
privilege accorded to government "housekeeping" records at any time;
courts should take a dim view of any such blanket claim of privilege.
In the Reynolds case, the court did admit ". . . that in addition to
the privilege against divulging state secrets . . . there is also a less
clearly defined privilege against disclosing official information if
such disclosure will actually be harmful to the interests of the
36 Id. at 997. Cf. "It would rather seem that the simple and natural process of
determination was precisely such a private perusal by the judge. Is it to be said that
even this much of disclosure cannot be trusted? Shall every subordinate in the de-
partment have access to the secret, and not the presiding officer of justice? Cannot
the constitutionally coordinate body of government share the confidence?" 8 WCi-
MORE, EVIDENCE §2379, p. 799 (3rd ed. 1940).
37 Bank Line v. United States, 163 F. 2d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 1947).
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nation." 38 When there is no military or diplomatic secret involved,
no informer's names being withheld, or no information delivered
under compulsion of law involved, it is difficult to perceive any harm
to the nation by a disclosure of the internal affairs of our governmental
agencies. There are two public interests involved: first, seeing that
justice is done to the parties in a law suit by requiring a disclosure
of all facts and issues relevant to the case; second, the public interest
in keeping the "housekeeping" records of our governmental depart-
ments and agencies secret. The two interests are in conflict. When
the two are balanced with each other the scales must almost always
tip in favor of the former. There may be instances when requiring
a disclosure so disrupts the orderly functioning of an agency that
any good to be obtained from the disclosure is outweighed by its
inconvenience. The burden of proving this should be put upon the
agency, and under no circumstances should the courts be foreclosed
from making an independent investigation of the validity of the
Government's claim of privilege.
Duane L. Isham
38 192 F. 2d at 994.
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